

# **Research Administration Network Agenda**

## **SUB Lobo A & B**

**May 14, 2019**

**9:00am to 10:00am**

1. Introduction of New staff (CGA)
2. Presentation on Foreign Influences (Industrial Security)
3. Transfers (OSP)
4. "That which shall not be named" and the issues to be aware of (CGA)
5. Proper forms of payments for faculty and students (CGA)
  - Issues w/ Extra Compensation for faculty (and more appropriate alternatives)
  - Issues for paying a student a stipend or student award (when salary was intended)
6. Authority of personnel on grants and contracts (CGA/OSP)
  - Who is the authorized representative listed and why it's important to know the difference when seeking agency approval
7. Update on Subaward workflow (OSP)
8. Year End Reminders (CGA)
  - Effort Certification deadlines
  - Chrome River deadlines
  - Other year-end deadlines and reminders



INDUSTRIAL  
SECURITY  
DEPARTMENT

# UNM INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

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Managing Risk

*Not*

Restricting Engagement

# UNM and Sensitive Information

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- UNM has contracts with CLASSIFIED and EXPORT CONTROLLED information
  - *UNM has been granted a TOP SECRET Facility Clearance by the U.S. Government*
  - *Our classified work is performed offsite, but we do have the ability to safeguard classified information up to the SECRET level at the ISD Facility*
  - *We have many contracts with EXPORT CONTROL restrictions, most are from the School of Engineering*
- The Industrial Security Department (ISD) oversees UNM's classified and export control projects

# Industrial Security Department

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- UNM's Industrial Security Department (ISD) ensures compliance with Government regulations over sensitive information:
  - *Classified Information*
    - The Facility Security Offices (FSO), **Ms. Deb Kuidis**, is the primary point of contact for contracts that require access to classified information
  - *Export Controlled Information*
    - The Export Control Officer (ECO), **Ms. Krista Laybourne**, is the primary point of contact for contracts that have export control restrictions

***The FSO and the ECO are back-up for each other.  
If you cannot reach one of us, please call the other!***

# Industrial Security Department:

## *Who are we?*

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- The Facility Security Officer (FSO) is Ms. Deborah (Deb) Kuidis
  - *Ms. Kuidis has over 10 years experience in Industrial Security*
  - *Ms. Kuidis retired from APD prior to joining UNM*
  - *In 2016 Ms. Kuidis and UNM received the James S. Cogswell Outstanding Industrial Security Award!*
  - *This is a highly selective award only granted to ~1% of Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs)*

# Industrial Security Department:

## *Who are we?*

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- The Export Control Officer (ECO) is Ms. Krista Laybourne
  - *Ms. Laybourne has over 10 years in Industrial Security*
  - *Ms. Laybourne previously worked for ATA and Schafer Corporation in Albuquerque*
  - *In 2012 Ms. Laybourne received the James S. Cogswell Outstanding Industrial Security Award*



DefenseTradeLaw.com

Our job is to make sure this doesn't happen to anyone at UNM!

# U.S. Government Policy on Foreign Influence

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- August 13, 2018 The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2019 becomes law
  - Section 1286 (a) dictates that the Secretary of Defense shall “establish an initiative to work with academic institutions who perform defense research... to limit undue influence, including through foreign talent programs...”
  - Section 1286 (b) dictates that the above (a) shall be developed and executed “with academic research institutions” who have a “record of excellence in industrial security...”
    - *UNM has been selected as one of these institutions.*
      - Currently there are ONLY 10 institutions on the Academic Security and Counter-Exploitation (ASCE) Consortium



# U.S. Government Policy on Foreign Influence

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- In response to the NDAA on August 20, 2018 National Institutes of Health issues letter detailing actions to protect “the integrity of U.S. biomedical research.”
  - They highlight the need for all “applicants and awardees” to disclose all forms of support
    - Including support from “foreign governments”
  - The letter encourages universities to reach out to an FBI field office to schedule a briefing on the matter.
    - UNM Main Campus received this briefing on Sept. 12
    - UNM HSC received this briefing on Oct. 10
  - The FBI briefing focused on the Chinese Government’s Thousand Talents Program.

*Department of Energy released a similar memo on 1/31/2019*


*Department of Defense released a similar memo on 3/20/2019*

# What does this mean to UNM?

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- The NIH, DOE and DoD are important sponsors to many projects at UNM.
  - *UNM cannot risk losing this funding.*
  - *ISD is here to support UNM's researchers navigate working on controlled technologies*
    - *Being on the ASCE and having strong relationships with our federal government partners ensures we are informed in this fast-changing environment*

**Working with research administrators (YOU!) we can prevent the removal of funding from the federal government.**



Cogswell Award



Counterintelligence Award

- Awarded the Counterintelligence Award from the Department of Defense in 2015
- Awarded the Cogswell Outstanding Industrial Security Achievement Award 2016
- These awards demonstrate the commitment by the University of New Mexico to protect classified and export-controlled information.

**UNM's Security Program is  
Nationally Recognized  
This can help us win contracts!**

# What is a Talents Program: China's Thousand Talents Program

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1. The Chinese Communist Party has created a talent recruitment program that incentivizes researchers, academics, and U.S. government employees to transfer foreign technology in support of China's rise as a world power.
2. **Hundreds of millions of U.S. government grant dollars and private sector technologies have been repurposed to support Chinese economic and military goals**
3. This is NOT breaking the law!
  - But...is it a conflict of interest?
  - The US Government is requiring FULL disclosure

## Chinese Intelligence Officer's Words On How China Targets Universities

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- “There is no risk in targeting universities”
- **“Universities are a soft target. US universities have no protection. It is your strength, but it is your weakness.”**
- Q. On a scale from 1-10, one being extremely easy, how hard is it to steal intellectually property from university by exploiting the researcher. A. “Very easy. We don’t waste our time on harder targets. The answer is 1.”
- “We want everything”
- “You cannot defeat us”

# Contractual Restrictions: NASA Solicitation

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- From the solicitation: *“Please note that proposals including citizens of or persons born in “Designated Countries” will be subject to additional levels of scrutiny which may result in a proposal being denied.....to ensure full compliance with U.S. export control and sanctions laws and regulations, it is NASA’s long-standing policy not to support or fund research activities of any citizens of, or persons born in, States Sponsors of Terrorism.....and their proposals are reviewed under a presumption of denial.”*
- [https://oiir.hq.nasa.gov/nasaecp/docs/DCList\\_10-24-2018.pdf](https://oiir.hq.nasa.gov/nasaecp/docs/DCList_10-24-2018.pdf)

# Federal Government is Contractually Forbidding UNM to Use Due to Spying Concerns (Supply Chain Concern)

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<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-huawei-tech-exclusive/exclusive-white-house-considers-new-year-executive-order-to-bar-huawei-zte-purchases-idUSKCN10Q09P>

<https://www.engadget.com/2017/07/12/us-government-removes-kaspersky-approved-vendors-cybersecurity/>

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2019/03/13/the-cybersecurity-202-republicans-want-kaspersky-huawei-banned-from-sensitive-university-research-projects/5c884bd91b326b0f7f38f152/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.6d9e2a7f6bb9](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2019/03/13/the-cybersecurity-202-republicans-want-kaspersky-huawei-banned-from-sensitive-university-research-projects/5c884bd91b326b0f7f38f152/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6d9e2a7f6bb9)

# Recent case: VA Tech Professor

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- Yiheng Percival Zhang was a biological systems engineering professor. In 2017, he was charged with *defrauding Virginia Tech, the National Science Foundation* and the U.S. Department of Energy. The complaint alleged that Zhang filed for grants to get money for work that had already been completed in China.
- Found guilty in February 2019, will be sentenced soon.
- [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/26/virginia-tech-professor-accused-of-scaming-national-science-foundation/?utm\\_term=.aae039e4f32d](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/26/virginia-tech-professor-accused-of-scaming-national-science-foundation/?utm_term=.aae039e4f32d)





# Solutions?

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- Continue to raise awareness
  - *The Provost & ISD hosted a Faculty Forum by the FBI and NIH on April 12*
  - *HSC & ISD are hosting an FBI briefing to HSC Deans & UNMH CEOs*
- Have a partnership with the RAN regarding disclosures
  - *Researchers receiving “Gifts?” “Donations?” Please notify ISD!*
- Roll security in acquisition process
  - *ISD can provide the wording for your proposals*
- Notify ISD of foreign scholars and guests to ensure they are not a restricted party
- Continue to work together!

# Good reads

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- Picking Flowers Making Honey

*Chinese Military collaboration with foreign universities*

*Described by the PLA as a process of ‘picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China’*

<https://www.aspi.org.au/report/picking-flowers-making-honey>

- Joint statement by the American Council on Education, AAU, APLU

*“Scholars or spies: Foreign Plots Targeting America’s Research and Development”*

<https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/Higher-Education-Statement-April-11-2018-House-SST-Cmte-Hearing.pdf>

- China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against The United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses. Presented to the Committee on the Judiciary U.S. Senate by Assistant Attorney General John C. Demers

[https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/witnesses/attachments/2018/12/18/12-05-2018\\_john\\_c\\_demers\\_testimony\\_re\\_china\\_non-traditional\\_espionage\\_against\\_the\\_united\\_states\\_the\\_threat\\_and\\_potential\\_policy\\_responses.pdf](https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/witnesses/attachments/2018/12/18/12-05-2018_john_c_demers_testimony_re_china_non-traditional_espionage_against_the_united_states_the_threat_and_potential_policy_responses.pdf)



INDUSTRIAL  
SECURITY  
DEPARTMENT

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# Questions

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- Do we have a legal obligation in the Terms and Conditions in our contracts that say we will protect the research we do on behalf of someone else?
- Do we currently have strong disclosure policies in place when there is foreign collaboration?
- Does the Talent Program breach loyalty to UNM? Do our FCOI Disclosures on MC and HSC ask who is working on DOE/NIH Contracts that are also working with Foreign entities? If so, is there a process to report disclosures to DOE, NIH, and ISD?
- Is it a conflict of interest to do the same work for UNM and China?
- Do we have a list of everyone (**PI's and Students**) who are working on DOD Grants/Contracts?
- What does OSP do if someone pops up on a US Government Restricted Party List?
- One sided? What is the university getting out it?
- What are the PI's and students responsibilities in protecting IP?
- Does UNM consider vulnerabilities and risk of supply chain?
- Are we adding compliance costs to contracts? (CUI? NIST 800-171? Deb and Krista salary?)
  - *Separate DOD rate*

## Military Colleges In China, Cover Institutes And Colleges That Only Exist On Paper

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- Nanyang Technological University – highest level of PLA collaboration – 125 joint publications
- Northwestern Institute of Nuclear Technology – nuclear and HPM weapons
- Navy Submarine Academy
- Armored Forces Engineering Academy – tank technology
- China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center – have sent scramjet researchers to study overseas
- Rocket Force Engineering University – missiles **claim to be from Xi'an Research Institute of High Technology and only exist on paper**
- Academy of Equipment Command and Technology – antisatellite weaponry (*sent a specialist in anti-satellite weaponry to the University of Michigan using civilian cover*)
  - <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20181029193127483>
- Zhengzhou Institute *cover for PLA scientists* interacting with foreigners. 300 peer reviewed papers have been published by authors claiming to be from the institute.
- Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute *exists only on paper* – 1300 peer reviewed publications
- Army Engineering University = National University of Defense Technology (AKA Changsha Institute of Technology)–*encourages students to exclude military and political courses to mislead overseas authorities*
- Harbin University
- Henan University clearly states they are associated with Thousand Talents program and offer at minimum - 2100 square foot apt., funding for academic team, \$300,000 annually, building of a lab to your specs
  - <http://en.henu.edu.cn/info/1032/1416.htm>

# International Travel To China

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Beihang University, previously known as Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

- *On restricted party list*
- *License required for ALL products, collaboration, conferences even if sponsored by third parties, EVERYTHING, etc.*
- *ISD must be informed of ALL travel to China to determine if a license is required and to check restricted party lists for any persons, universities, industries, etc., with whom a UNM employee may collaborate in China.*


# New DSS SVA Counterintelligence based

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- Participation in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) is being reviewed with a **COUNTERINTELLIGENCE** based approach
  - Previously our compliance with the “NISP Operating Manual (NISPOM)” was the basis of review
  - The new approach DICTATES that we protect the most *targeted technologies* to **DELIVER UNCOMPROMISED**
- This is a “cradle to grave approach” – and could include reviewing our protections of information when research changes from “fundamental to applied”
- How?
  - Identity ASSESTS
  - Understand SUPPLY CHAIN
  - Understand VULNERABILITIES
  - Create TAILORED SECURITY PLAN
- What does this all mean?
  - It is imperative for the ISD to understand UNM’s research programs *for both MC/HSC*

# ‘Made in China 2025’

- Made in China 2025 is a strategic plan of China issued by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and his cabinet in May 2015.
- Goal is to be superior to the US both economically and militarily
- Targeted technology
- ***All of society approach – All of government approach***
  - *NO separation between Government and Private Sector*
- Steal our technology and make it better





# China's Strategic Goals - 2025

## (U) China's Toolkit for Foreign Technology Acquisition

### Legal and Regulatory Environment



(U) In 2012, World Bank recommendations for sustaining China's long-term economic development included modernizing China's financial regulatory architecture by increasing legal, disclosure, auditing, and accounting standards and addressing pervasive and risky "shadow bank" loans.



### Non-Traditional Collectors

(U) In May 2017, the US DOJ charged seven individuals with conspiracy to steal trade secrets related to high performance, dual use materials on behalf of a company in China, according to a DOJ press release.



### Joint Ventures

(U) In November 2017, Chinese carmaker Zotye Auto signed a \$755 million joint venture (JV) agreement with Ford Motor Company, the company's third JV in China, dedicated to building electric vehicles.



### Research Partnerships

(U) In November 2017, the Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology announced it had established a joint laboratory with the US National Center for Atmospheric Research and Texas A&M University to develop advanced earth system modeling.



### Cyber Theft

(U) In December 2017, the Department of Justice and Department of Commerce announced the unsealing of a 12-count indictment outing various charges against Chinese nationals in relation to their cyber targeting of US victim companies.



### S&T Investments

(U) As of December 2017, Chinese venture capital firms were among the top in the world for investment in virtual reality, autonomous vehicles, robotics, and artificial intelligence.



### Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)

(U) In 2017, state-owned enterprise ChemChina bought Syngenta, a leading multinational agricultural biotechnology firm, for \$43 billion.



### Front Companies

(U) In 2016, the DOJ unsealed an indictment against one of the world's leading protein biochemists, who allegedly created companies in China and the US to profit from stolen trade secrets.



### Talent Recruitment Programs

(U) In March 2017, a Chinese Academy of Sciences researcher credited a former Los Alamos National Laboratory researcher, who became a laboratory director at Peking University, as a key contributor to China's development of hypersonic weapons.



### Security Services

(U) China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) is responsible for Counterespionage and Counterintelligence, Foreign Intelligence, and Domestic Intelligence. China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is the National Police and also provides Domestic Intelligence functions.

# What Can We Lose - What Have We Lost

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- Per Dan Payne, Director of DSS:
  - *We have lost 12 Petabytes (a million gigabytes) of information to China -*
  - *The loss of unclassified rises to the classified and SAP level*
    - ***“Classified by compilation”***
  - *\$225-\$600 Billion annually Jobs Time*
  
- Not just defense related:
  - *Research in Cancer and Alzheimer’s patents can also be lost*
  - *Jobs Time Money*
  
- Ability to collaborate
  - *If doing EC work, students on TCP can only talk to each other. Can’t collaborate, share, discuss with other Foreign National students*
  
  - ***The more we lose, the more regulations the Government will put on collaboration with Foreign Nationals.***

# Confucius Institutes

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- The chancellor of the Texas A&M system said the university would terminate its agreement to host Confucius Institutes -- centers for Chinese language teaching and cultural programming funded by the Chinese government -- in response to the urging of two congressmen who described the institutes as threats to national security.
- “We strongly urge these universities to consider terminating their partnerships with Confucius Institutes and other Chinese government supported organizations,” Representatives Cuellar and McCaul said in a joint statement accompanying the letter's release. “These organizations are a threat to our nation’s security by serving as a platform for China’s intelligence collection and political agenda. We have a responsibility to uphold our American values of free expression, and to do whatever is necessary to counter any behavior that poses a threat to our democracy.”
- Federal Bureau of Investigation director Christopher Wray, who told the Senate Intelligence Committee in February that the FBI has concerns about Confucius Institutes and in some cases has “developed appropriate investigative steps” in relation to them.
- Senators from other states have written letters to universities in their states to cut ties

<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/09/texas-am-cuts-ties-confucius-institutes-response-congressmens-concerns>

# National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) John McCain Act

Section 1286

July 23, 2018

## INITIATIVE TO SUPPORT PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS FROM UNDUE INFLUENCE AND OTHER SECURITY THREATS

- The Secretary of Defense shall establish an initiative to work with academic institutions who perform defense research and engineering activities-
- (1) To support protection of intellectual property, controlled information, key personnel, and information about critical technologies relevant to national security-
- (2) To limit undue influence, including through foreign talent programs, by countries to exploit US technology with the Department of Defense research, science and technology, and innovation enterprise-
- **RECORD OF EXCELLENCE: -In selecting research institutions of higher education that the Secretary determines demonstrate a record of excellence in industrial security in academia and in research and development**
- (1) Develop and information exchange program to enable awareness of security threats being executed against United States research
- (2) Training and other support for academic institutions to promote security *including financial support for execution of such activities*
- (3) To assess whether individuals affiliated with Department of Defense programs have participated in or currently participating in foreign talent programs or expert recruitment programs
- **WHILE AT THE SAME TIME.... BEING CONSISTENT WITH POLICIES THAT PROTECT OPEN AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE IN FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH**

<https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf>

- Search for Section 1286

# Attorney General Sessions “China Initiative” Fact Sheet (10 Goals) Nov 1, 2018

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- Develop an enforcement strategy concerning non-traditional collectors (e.g., researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base) that are being coopted into transferring technology contrary to U.S. interests;
- Educate colleges and universities about potential threats to academic freedom and open discourse from influence efforts on campus;
- Apply the Foreign Agents Registration Act to unregistered agents seeking to advance China’s political agenda
- Better address supply chain threats, especially ones impacting telecommunications prior to the transition to 5G networks
  - <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1107256/download>
  - <https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/enforcement-action/a-look-at-the-justice-departments-new-china-initiative>

# Change to Fundamental Research Definition

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NSDD 189 (September 21, 1985)

*"'Fundamental research' means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons."*

- Treats all foreign nationals the same
- Treats all technology the same

<https://research.uci.edu/policy-library/export-control-policies/govt-fundamental-research-policy>

New contract terms universities have seen:

*This is FR but you can't publish or no FN allowed*

*Notify SNL if a FN is involved in FR*

Dr. Bindu Nair, Director For Basic Research, Office of the Secretary of Defense:

“6.1 (“I don’t think they are planning to touch”)

6.2 or applied is where change will start

6.3 Cannot be FR”

# Disclose

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## DOE

- DOE personnel will be subject to limitations, including prohibitions on their ability currently or in the future to participate in foreign talent recruitment programs of countries determined sensitive by DOE while employed by DOE, or performing work within the scope of a DOE contract. These limitations will apply to recipients of financial assistance (e.g., grants or cooperative agreements).
- <https://www.aip.org/sites/default/files/aipcorp/images/fyi/pdf/DOE-memo-on-foreign-government-talent-recruitment-programs.pdf>

*As the conduit for the FBI, we also have a reporting requirement and have to be part of the disclosure process*


*Purdue's letter to faculty:*

[https://www.purdue.edu/business/sps/pdf/Foreign\\_Influence\\_Memo\\_8Nov2018.pdf](https://www.purdue.edu/business/sps/pdf/Foreign_Influence_Memo_8Nov2018.pdf)

## NIH

- Applicants and awardees must disclose all forms of other support and financial interests, including support from foreign governments or other foreign entities.
- [https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server\\_files/media/NIH%20Foreign%20Influence%20Letter%20to%20Grantees%2008-20-18.pdf](https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/NIH%20Foreign%20Influence%20Letter%20to%20Grantees%2008-20-18.pdf)

DoD Memo with similar requirements received 3/29/2019

A background image of a complex network diagram with numerous nodes and connecting lines, overlaid on a light gray grid. A large red rectangle is positioned on the left side of the image, containing the main title and subtitle. A dark blue rectangle is located in the bottom right corner, containing the meeting information.


# COMPENSATION GUIDELINES

Appropriate compensation for faculty and students

RAN Meeting  
5/14/2019



# Basic Research Faculty Salary Composition



# Minimum Effort on Sponsored Projects

- In agreement with best practices being followed by similar high-activity research institutions, the University has determined **the minimum amount of effort committed to a specific sponsored research activity as a direct charge may be no less than 1% of the Principal Investigator's, Co-Investigator's and Key Personnel's University Effort.**
- Beyond this limit, the specific amount of effort committed to a particular sponsored activity is left to the judgment of the Principal Investigator, based on his or her estimate of the actual effort necessary to meet the technical goals and outcomes of the project. **In most cases, it is expected that the effort will be substantially larger than 1%.**

# Exceptions to Minimum Effort Policy

- **The following are excluded from the requirements set forth by the policy:**
  - Equipment and Instrumentation grants for acquisition, unless the PI or key personnel will have effort devoted to installation, setup, etc.
  - Doctoral dissertation grants or other awards intended as “student augmentation” such as Fellowship/Scholarship awards.
  - Training grants (e.g., T32, Mentors on K/Career Awards)
  - Specific purpose awards such as travel grants, workshops, and conference support grants
  - National Science Foundation (NSF) Research Experience for Undergraduates (REU) supplements\*
  - National Institutes of Health (NIH) Minority Supplements\*
  - National Institutes of Health (NIH) Other Significant Contributors as cited in the agency’s SF424 Application Guide
  - Faculty mentors on institutional training grants and large Center proposals with significant training components, including, but not limited to, NSF STC, MRSEC, EPSCoR, PIRE and PREM.

\* Committed effort for the PI must be present on the research grant that receives the supplement.

# Summer Effort (for faculty with 9-month Academic Appointments)

- Federal grant rules do not allow 9-month Faculty to pay themselves more than 1/9th of their salary in any one summer month. Faculty on 9-month appointments may pay themselves a maximum of 3/9ths of their academic year salary during the summer.  
<http://ofas.unm.edu/faculty/compensation/documents/summer-research-2019-memo.pdf>
- Faculty receiving summer salary from a sponsored project will typically perform such work in their normal place of business (i.e., the University) unless the project requires that the work be conducted off site. If a faculty member has academic, administrative or other non-research activities (such as vacation) during the summer period, he or she may be precluded from devoting 100% effort to sponsored projects and thus from requesting summer salary from those sponsored projects.

# Extra Compensation Guidelines

- Research, public service and instruction are all considered as part of a faculty member's regular duties. IntraUniversity consulting on an occasional basis is also considered a normal part of a faculty member's duties. Because of this, **requests for extra compensation (payments during the academic year in addition to the faculty member's regular nine-month contract amount) should be very rare.**

## INTERNAL UNIVERSITY APPROVAL:

- Consistent with [UNM Faculty Handbook policy C140](#) and 2 CFR 200, extra compensation must first meet the following criteria:
  1. The work performed must be in addition to the faculty member's regular departmental load *and*
  2. One of two circumstances must exist:
    - a. The consultation is across departmental lines or
    - b. The work involves a separate or remote operation*and*
  3. The work performed cannot conflict with the faculty member's regular University duties and assignments.

# Extra Compensation Guidelines

## **AGENCY APPROVAL:**

- If University approval is obtained and the proposal budget and justification specifically provided for extra compensation and is funded without being eliminated by the sponsor, this constitutes implicit approval by the sponsor.
- If, after award, UNM wants to pay extra compensation to a person on the grant which was not part of the original proposal budget, the sponsoring agency's contracting or grant officer (person who can legally sign the contract or grant, not a program or technical officer) must approve the use of the Extra Compensation before payment can be issued to an individual at UNM.
- The PI should work with the Office of Sponsored Projects to obtain agency approval. The PI may also want to get verbal concurrence from the program officer at the funding agency prior to contacting the contracting or grant officer.
- **Extra compensation cannot be paid unless both University and agency approval have been obtained.**


# STUDENT PAYMENTS

This Determination Flowchart is intended as a guide, and is not all inclusive. Determination is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case; each instance must be individually determined.

The flowchart does **NOT** apply to students not currently enrolled at the University of New Mexico

**Other notes:**

- Assistantships are processed via Payroll, through OGS (tuition portion is processed via Financial Aid)
- Scholarships and Fellowships are processed via Financial Aid
- Prizes and Awards may be processed through Accounts Payable via Chrome River; or via Financial Aid depending on circumstances
  - Those processed thru A/P to students who are also employees are subsequently reported to Payroll by the Accounting Office
- "Stipends" associated with work being performed are to be paid via Payroll
- "Stipends" for living expenses are to be paid via Financial Aid



The image features a background of a complex network diagram with black lines and nodes on a light gray background. A prominent horizontal red band is centered across the image. The text "THANK YOU" is written in white, bold, uppercase letters within this red band. There are two dark blue rectangular shapes, one at the top center and one at the bottom center, partially overlapping the network diagram.

**THANK YOU**